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The widespread movement from dened benet (DB) plans to dened contribution
(DC) plans over the past few decades has transferred much of the retirement savings
risk from the institution to the individual, particularly in the private sector. This study
uses the Retirement Condence Survey of College and University Faculty, 2005 to ex-
amine the use of DC plans relative to DB plans among faculty and the impact of plan
incentives on expected retirement age. This study nds that the dierence in retire-
ment wealth accrual patterns between the two types of plans generates an eight-month
dierence in expected retirement ages for individuals in a DC plan relative to those in
a DB plan. Preferences over career length double the eect of incentives: individuals
who elect to enroll in a DB plan expect to retire sixteen months earlier than those
who chose to enroll in a DC plan. In addition, this paper nds that individuals choose
retirement plans to diversity their sources of retirement income, which has implications
for proposed policies that incorporate individual accounts into Social Security.
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21 Introduction
The Retirement Condence Survey of College and University Faculty represents a distinc-
tive opportunity to examine the relative use of dened contribution (DC) plans and dened
benet (DB) plans across institutions and individuals. The widespread replacement of DB
plans by DC plans over the past few decades has transferred much of the retirement saving
risk from the institution to the individual, particularly in the private sector.1;2
This change has likely in
uenced saving behavior, retirement planning, and condence
regarding lifestyle maintenance in retirement. While this particular survey examines the
responses of college and university faculty, its ndings are relevant to those working in the
non-academic sector and to policy-makers. Both DB and DC plans are represented across
academic institutions, with a substantial fraction of universities oering a choice between
plans. Using the Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement Policies, Ehrenberg (2001) nds
that nearly 36 percent of academic institutions oer a faculty a choice between retiremetn
plans (see Table 1). Because faculty members with a choice between plans choose the
option that gives them the highest utility, analyzing determinants of plan selection can
improve policy-makers understanding of how the transition from DB to DC pension plans
has aected workers outside of academia. This paper nds evidence of a demand for a
dened benet income stream and a diversied portfolio of retirement assets, which is
relevant to the policy debate surrounding Social Security reform.
The end of mandatory retirement for faculty in 1994 has increased the attention placed
on the age composition of faculty by college and university administrators. These admin-
istrators have become increasingly interested in how pension plan type or other human
1According to the 2004 National Compensation Survey of private industry employees, 21% of workers
have access to a DB plan, while 53% have access to a DC plan (National Compensation Survey 2004, Table
1).
2In 2004, 11% of the Fortune 1000 companies sponsoring a DB plan froze or terminated their plan, which
is up from 7% in 2003.
1resource practices surrounding the usage of retirement savings vehicles, such as nancial
education, aect the retirement age of faculty. In addition, knowing how pension plan type
aets retirement age will improve forecasts regarding the age distribution of faculty, which
is essential for salary and hiring projections.
Dierences in retirement wealth accrual patterns between DB and DC plans results
in dierent retirement incentives across the two plans. To estimate the eect of plan
incentives on retirement behavior, this analysis assumes that the menu of pension plans
oered by an institution is not a primary determinant of a faculty-institution pairing. For
institutions that oer a single retirement plan, the faculty member's \choice" of plan is
exogenous and dierences in expected retirement age across plans will be attributed to
plan incentives. However, for faculty members oered a choice between enrolling in either
a DC or a DB plan, this assumption is no longer valid because these individuals incorporate
their retirement expectations { namely their preference for career length and work { when
choosing between the two plan types. Hence the impact of pension plan type on expected
retirement age will depend upon a combination of incentives and preferences for those
faculty oered a choice between plans. By comparing the expected retirement ages of
individuals with a choice between retirement plans to those without a choice, this study
attempts to quantify the relative eect of faculty preferences and pension plan incentives
on expected retirement age.
Holding other factors constant, this study nds that dierences in plan incentives create
an eight-month wedge in expected retirement ages: faculty in a DC plan expect to retire
eight months later, on average, relative to those in a DB plan. Preferences over career
length double the eect of incentives: individuals who choose to enroll in a DC plan expect
to retire sixteen months later than those who chose to enroll in a DB plan. The impact
of preferences appears to be slightly asymmetric with respect to plan choice: the expected
2retirement age of those choosing a DC plan does not dier from those enrolled in a DC
plan without a choice between plans, but those choosing a DB plan expect to retire over six
month earlier than those enrolled in a DB plan without a choice; however, this dierence
is only marginally signicant.
In addition, women expect to retire eighteen months earlier than men, as do faculty
with a Bachelor's or Master's degree relative to those with doctorates or professional de-
grees. Financial literacy and scal position also have a sizable eect: those who are more
nancially literate expect to retire one year later as do individuals unburdened by debt.
As for institutional characteristics, faculty at institutions that oer retirees health insur-
ance expect to retire earlier than those at institutions without this insurance, although the
dierence is not statistically signicant.3
Besides analyzing the eect of plan type on retirement expectations, this analysis ex-
amines determinants of plan selection because faculty members at a substantial number of
public institutions are one of the few groups of workers who have been consistently oered
a choice between plans. This paper nds that individuals choose to diversity their retire-
ment assets: faculty members who are not covered by Social Security are substantially less
likely to enroll in a DC plan when presented with a choice between plans. In addition, a
lack of nancial sophistication and lower household income negatively aect an individual's
probability of contributing to a supplemental tax-deferred account (TDA) after electing to
enroll in a DB plan as her primary employer-sponsored plan.
The next section of this paper discusses the previous literature on the end of mandatory
retirement for faculty and its eect on college and university retirement policies as well as
previous research on pension plan choice. Section 3 outlines a simple model of pension
wealth accrual to demonstrate the dierence in retirement incentives between DB and DC
3Gruber and Madrian (1995) nd that health insurance coverage for retirees increases retirement hazards
by 30 percent.
3plans. Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis, while Section 5 provides results
from the estimation. Section 6 concludes the analysis.
2 Literature Review
The eect of pension plans { particularly traditional DB plans { on turnover has been
analyzed extensively in the literature. For example, Lazear (1990) shows that evaluating
pension wealth using an option value approach generates the empirical regularity that
turnover rates plummet as service length approaches the plan's vesting requirement and
then spike following vesting. Instead of examining the relationship between pension plans
and years of service, this paper focuses on the retirement incentives created by the benet
formulas of traditional DB plans as opposed to the retirement age-neutrality of DC plans.
This section rst motivates the importance of understanding retirement incentives created
by the two pension plan types by examining the explict incentives used by college and
universities since the end of mandatiry retirement. Next, this section reviews the previous
literature on pension plan selection by faculty.
2.1 End of Mandatory Retirement
Analyzing the relationship between plan type and the timing of retirement has become
increasingly important to academic institutions because the end of mandatory retirement
has left the timing of retirement up to the individual. The relationship is also important
outside of academia because terminating employment has become more dicult due to
anti-discrimination statutes and the in
uence of collective bargaining contracts (Pencavel,
2005). Due to the large number of new faculty hired in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as low
separation rates and the end of mandatory retirement, the age distribution of faculty at
colleges and universities has become skewed toward older ages (Clark, 2005). As pointed
4out by Clark, 31 percent of faculty members were 55 years old or older in 1998 as opposed
to 25 percent in 1987. The end of mandatory retirement in 1994 changed the relationship
between faculty members and academic institutions: previously, tenured faculty members
enjoyed job security and academic freedom in exchange for the institution's right to end the
employment relationship at age 70. Since the end of mandatory retirement, there has been
a marked decrease in retirement rates among faculty at or approaching age 70. Ashenfelter
and Card (2002) report that retirement rates for faculty at age 70 dropped from a rate of
75.6 percent in 1987 through 1993 to 29.1 percent between 1994 and 1996. Clark, Ghent,
and McDermed (2006) also found a sharp decrease in retirement among faculty in the
University of North Carolina system at age 70. It appears that mandatory retirement did
constrain the career length preferences of some faculty members.
The retirement of existing faculty typically generates new positions, which allows col-
lege and university administrators to reallocate faculty across departments to respond to
changes in student demand, bring new ideas into the department, and an opportunity to
reduce labor costs by replacing tenured faculty positions with non-tenured professorships
or part-time positions. Clark (2005) notes that this assumes that the costs of retaining
older faculty { such as higher labor costs and limited promotional and hiring opportuni-
ties for younger faculty { outweigh the benets of their teaching and researching abilities.
Hence, the decision to encourage retirement of older faculty depends on the needs of the
particular college or university.
With the end of mandatory retirement, colleges and universities have used other means
to provide faculty with incentives to relinquish tenure. These include phased retirement
programs in which faculty members resign their full-time positions { often relinquishing
tenure { in exchange for the right to work half-time at half-salary for a given number
of years (Allen, 2005). In general, phased retirement refers to any formal program that
5smoothes the transition from full-time employment to complete retirement from the aca-
demic institution. Ehrenberg (2001) reports that 27 percent of institution responding to
the Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement Policies conducted in 2000 indicate that they
oer a phased retirement program.4
While phased retirement is designed to ease faculty members into retirement, institu-
tions have also used buyout programs to abruptly reduce the number of faculty, typically
in response to budget shortfalls. Buyouts can take the form of lump-sum payments or an
augmentation of pension benets if a DB pension is oered by the academic institution.
Buyouts usually specify a time window during which these incentives are valid, as well as
a restriction on age. Ehrenberg (2001) nds that 35 percent of colleges and universities
oered buyouts since 1995.
Besides using explicit retirement incentives through buyouts or phased retirement pro-
grams, DC and DB pension plans create dierent retirement incentives as a result of
dierences in benet accrual patterns. DC plans are basically age-neutral with respect to
retirement. With an additional year of service, the value of a DC plan increases due to
three factors: 1) an additional year of contributions; 2) an additional year of market return
on previous contributions; and, if an annuity is purchased, 3) larger annual payments due
to a shortened remaining life expectancy. In contrast to DC plans, benets distributed
through DB plans are formulaic: typically the plan multiplies an individual's years of ser-
vice by an average of their nal salaries (FAS) and then multiplies this product by some
multiple, typically between 1 and 2 percent, to obtain the annual benet for a single-life
annuity.5 If one retires before the plan's normal retirement age, benets are reduced to
4This survey was a joint eort by the American Association of University Professors, TIAA-CREF
Institute, American Council of Education, College and University Professional Association for Human
Resources, National Association of College and University Business Ocers, and Cornell University.
5Final Average Salary (FAS) typically is an average of salaries earned over the nal 3 to 5 years of
service, but could be as simple as taking the salary earned in the nal year prior to retirement.
6take into account the longer remaining life expectacy at retirement (i.e. expect to collect
benets for a greater number of years). Once the worker reseaches the normal retiremetn
age, an increase in the annual benet amount from postponing retirement one year could
only come from two sources: 1) an increase in FAS by replacing a lower salary with a
higher salary; and 2) an additional year of service in the benet formula. However, the
annual benet paid is not increased to actuarially adjust for the shorter expected duration
of benets due to retiring at an older age. Hence, DB wealth typically decreases with addi-
tional years of service beyond the plan's normal retirement age. This creates an incentive
to separate from the institution at this age.
Due to the dierences in retirement incentives across DB and DC plans, the type
of plan sponsored by the institution could aect whether an institution oers explicit
retirement incentives, such as phased retirement or pension buyouts. Pencavel (2005)
examines the factors that increase the use of phased retirement programs and buyouts by
colleges and universities using data collected in the Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement
Policies in 2000. He nds that institutions with only a DC plan were 24 percent more
likely to have phased retirement relative to those oering a plan with a DB component.
Research universities were 10 percent more likely to have phased retirement programs and
public institutions were 7 percent more likely to oer these programs relative to private
institutions. Similarly, he nds that since 1994 institutions that oer a DC-only plan were
13 percent more likely to present a buyout oer to its faculty.6 The nding that institutions
with a DC-only plan are more likely to oer phased retirement plans is consistent with
administrators implementing strategies to encourage faculty to relinquish tenure because
a DC plan does not create these incentives.
Allen, Clark and Ghent (2004) conducted a study of retirement behavior of faculty
6From this same logistic regression, public institutions were 18 percent less likely to oer a buyout and
doctoral granting institutions were 17 percent more likely.
7in the University of North Carolina (UNC) system, which instituted a phased retirement
program in 1996. This program gives tenured faculty meeting a specied age and service
length requirement the option of teaching half-time at half-pay for a xed number of years
in exchange for relinquishing tenure.7 They nd that this program increased the total
number of faculty in or transitioning into retirement, and that those individuals with lower
ability { measured in terms of pay increases { were more likely to enter phased retirement.
They also nd that full and phased retirement rates were higher for faculty enrolled in the
state DB plan versus those enrolled in a DC plan oered by the university. This dierence
could be due to the economic incentives that favor retiring early once the faculty member
is part of the state DB plan. Alternatively, this could be due to self-selection: faculty who
chose to enroll in a DB plan have revealed a preference for a shorter career due to the benet
accrual pattern that favors early retirement.8 Both selection and incentives likely play a
role. Decomposing the eect of incentives and selection is important for administrators
as they try to design programs to encourage retirement because the majority of academic
institutions do not present their faculty with a choice between plans. This decomposition
is also relevant to plan administrators and HR practitioners outside of academia. Because
this paper uses data on faculty from a cross-section of universities representing a variety of
pension plan menus, the eect of plan incentives can be distinguished from career length
preferences.
2.2 Choice between Dened Contribution and Dened Benet Plans
As seen in Table 1, over half of public universities oer faculty a choice between enrolling
in a DB and a DC plan. It is important to note that the provision of plan types is related
7The xed number of years ranges from two to ve depending on the college or university within the
UNC system.
8Faculty in the UNC system have a choice between pension plans.
8to institutional characteristics: public colleges and universities typically oer DB plans,
while private colleges and universities oer DC plans (Ehrenberg, 2001; Pencavel, 2005).
As also seen in Table 1, public universities are much more likely to oer faculty a choice
between plans as well as a combination DC-DB plan.9
The choice is typically between enrolling in a DB plan sponsored by the state for public
employees or the DC plan sponsored by the academic institution. Clark and Pitts (1999) is
one of just a handful of studies on retirement plan choice among employees. They examine
the choice between a DB and DC plan among faculty in the UNC system. They nd that
the value of a DB plan relative to a DC plan increases with age when hire and actual
length of service, but an increase in demand for DC plans over time.10 Clark, Ghent, and
McDermed (2006) extend the analysis to faculty hired into the UNC system between 1983
and 2001. Besides conrming the nding that the probability of enrolling in the DB has
decreased over time, they nd that women are more likely to enroll in the DB plan relative
to men and that the probability of enrolling in the DB plan is increasing in the age at
which the individual was hired. The analysis of plan choice in this chapter is similar to
that of Clark and Pitts (1999) and Clark, Ghent, and McDermed (2006), but the main
advantage of the Retirement Condence Survey of College and University Faculty is that
it is not limited to faculty at a single institution.
Brown and Weisbenner (2007) conduct a study of pension plan choice for employees
in the State Universities Retirement System (SURS) of Illinois. Unlike Clark and Pitts
(1999), Brown and Weisbenner analyze the choice for all university employees, including
9In the data collected by the Survey of Changes in Faculty Retirement Policies, combination plans are
typically a mandatory DB plan with a supplemental DC component to which faculty can elect to contribute
(Pencavel, 2005).
10Because the value of a DB plan increases most in the nal years before retirement, the value of DC
plan relative to a DB plan is higher for those faculty who expect to leave the university before retirement.
Clark and Pitts (1999) use actual service length, as measured in the administrative records, as a proxy for
mobility expectation.
9administrators, faculty, and sta. They nd that the majority of employees (55.7 percent
of workforce) do not make an active choice between the three oered plans (DC, portable-
DB, and traditional-DB) and are instead defaulted into the traditional-DB plan after six
months of service. Of those employees making an active choice (44.3 percent of workforce),
most choose the portable-DB plan (42 percent), followed by the DC plan (34.5 percent) and
the traditional-DB plan (23.5 percent). They nd that married individuals with greater
annual income, higher education, and who are working at an institution where a higher
fraction of employees choose the DC plan are more likely to enroll in the DC plan. Because
they focus on plans oered by a single institution, Brown and Weisbenner evaluate the
merits of the three dierent plans. Interestingly, they nd that under reasonable assump-
tions about market returns the portable-DB is the optimal plan, yet the more nancially
sophisticated individuals elect the DC plan.11 Their case study allows for a detailed analy-
sis of plan choice, which enables them to uncover systematic mistakes made by individuals
in their selection of pension plans. However, restricting their analysis only to employees in
SURS generates a few shortcomings. Besides the diculty of generalizing their ndings to
other universities due the unique plan menu and benet formulas, employees in SURS are
not covered by Social Security. Thus, the authors cannot determine how Social Security
coverage aects plan choice. Because the data used in this paper include faculty with and
without Social Security coverage, the eect of coverage on plan choice is analyzed.
The termination of a DB plan by an employer also provides an opportunity to study
plan choice because employees are typically oered the option of remaining in the DB plan
or switching to the newly-created DC plan. Papke (2004) studies the plan selection of
Michigan public employees, who were oered a one-time switch from the existing DB plan
11Employees who leave the institution after vesting would have to earn an annual return of 8.5% over a
30-year time horizon in order for the DC plan to be optimal relative to the portable-DB plan (Brown and
Weisbenner, 2007).
10to a state-sponsored DC plan. However, the examination of determinants of plan choice
was limited due to the very small fraction of employees who elected into the DC plan. Yang
(2005) examines the one-time choice of workers at a non-prot institution to switch from
the employer-sponsored DB plan to a DC plan. She nds that over half of the employees
switched plans and workers who are female, white, and have higher incomes are more likely
to choose a DC plan. In addition, those with prior experience in a DC plan and those who
had a lower expected internal rate of return in the DB plan are more likely to elect the DC
plan. She also nds that the default option { employees were kept in the DB plan if they
did not select a plan { aected the outcome for a sizable faction of workers. She nds that
those who stayed in the DB plan by default where more similar in characteristics to those
who elected the DC plan, suggesting that these workers would have been better o if they
had switched plans. Similar to Brown and Weisbenner (2007), Yang provides insight into
the role played by defaults; however, both of these studies are limited because the analysis
is restricted to one employer.
While the economic incentives inherent in DB plans will likely decrease the retirement
age of plan participants relative to those in a DC plan, this has not been tested while
controlling for whether the faculty member had a choice between plans because the analyses
in the literature have only looked at plan choice at a single institution. The data collected in
the Retirement Condence Survey of College and University Faculty allow for an analysis of
how plan incentives aect retirement expectations by looking at those faculty members who
do not have a choice between plans. Additionally, by comparing the expected retirement
age of faculty who have a choice between pension plans with those without such a choice,
this paper examines whether preferences over career length enhance dierences in plan
incentives.
113 Models of Pension Choice and Pension Wealth Accrual
This section rst outlines a framework for analyzing the choice between pension plans and
then explicitly examines the dierence in pension wealth accrual patterns between DB and
DC plans. For plan selection, individuals are assumed to choose the plan that gives them
the highest expected utility. The dierence between the expected utility from a DC plan
and the expected utility of a DB plan can be analyzed in a latent index framework:
EUi(DC)   EUi(DB) = (1)
I(mobilityi;risk aversioni;nancial literacyi;other annuityi;yeari)
The dierence in the expected values is not observable, but the choice made by the faculty
is known. If the dierence in Equation 1, EUi(DC) EUi(DB), is positive, the individual
chooses the DC plan. This dierence is a function of mobility risk, risk aversion, nancial
literacy, other annuity assets, and a time trend. DC assets are more portable than DB assets
because DB plans have longer vesting requirements and because DC assets can be rolled
over into another DC plan, therefore, the index is increasing in mobility risk. The index is
decreasing in risk aversion because DC assets expose the individual to more investment risk.
It should be noted that the possibility of default is a legitimate risk of DB plans, which has
become clear recently in the private sector due to under-funding of pension funds. Because
DC plans require the individual to make contribution and investment decisions, the index
is increasing in nancial literacy. Holding other dened benet retirement assets, such as
Social Security, reduces the value of a DB plan from the standpoint of asset diversication
and thus increases the value of the index. Finally, since there has been a shift to DC plans
over time, particularly in the private sector, individuals hired in later years could be more
familiar with these savings plans and thus may be more likely to choose this type of plan.
12Many of the aforementioned factors in the above index are not directly observable in the
data and thus other characteristics will be used as proxies. Job position and education will
be used as proxies for mobility risk as well as for career length preferences (the underlying
assumption being that individuals with doctorates have a greater preference for a long
career than individuals with Bachelor's or Master's degrees). Gender will be used as a
proxy for risk aversion: females are assumed to be more risk averse than males. In the
survey, faculty were asked whether they have calculated the amount of savings they will
need to live comfortably in retirement; responding armatively to this question is a proxy
for nancial literacy or savvy. Another measure of nancial literacy, or scal health, is
whether debt is a major or minor concern for the individual. The presence of other dened
benet assets in the individual's retirement portfolio is measured by whether the individual
is covered by Social Security.12 The increasing popularity of DC plans is captured by a
series of binary variables for the decade in which the individual was hired (i.e. the year
she made a choice between plans).
For the estimation, I, is approximated by a linear function of the covariates described
above plus an additive error term, u, to account for unobservable heterogeneity. Equation 2
denes the linear index and I is the value of the index: a positive value for I corresponds
to the individual choosing to enroll in the DC plan (e.g. the DC plan has the higher
expected utiltiy):
I
i = Xi + 1 positioni (2)
+2 educationi + 3 nancial literacyi + 4 SS Coveragei + 5 hireyeari + i:
In the above equation, Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics, such as gender, marital
12A home is another asset that could provide a stream of income similar to an annuity (e.g. through a
reverse mortgage); however, the data does not contain a clean measure of homeownership.
13status, and household income. If we assume that i is distributed standard normal, we can
estimate the probability of choosing a DC plan using a probit model. Hence, we have the
following specication:
Pr(DCi = 1) = (Xi + 1 positioni (3)
+2 educationi + 3 nancial literacyi + 4 SS Coveragei + 5 hireyeari)
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The results on the
determinants of plan selection for those individuals oered a choice between plans are
presented in Section 5.1.
As for the eect of plan type on retirement behavior, this paper conducts a reduced-
form analysis relating individual characteristics and plan type to expected retirement age.
The starting point for the analysis is that the change in pension wealth from postponing
retirement an extra year is not the same across DB and DC plans. For example, think of











where yt is the stream of non-wage income, wt is the stream of after-tax wages and Bp is
the stream of benets received from plan type p at retirement (age aR) until the individual
dies (age T).
The change in the expected value from postponing retirement one year is:
dEVa(aR)
daR








daR is the change in the stream of benets for plan p from postponing retirement.
14For DC plans, this value is always positive. However, for DB plans it could be positive
or negative depending on how the individual's retirement age relates to the plan's normal
retirement age (NRA).
The dierence in benet accrual between the two plans was discussed previously in
Section 2.2. To be more explicit, the annual benet received in retirement for individual i
in DB plan j has the following structure:
Annual Benefiti = Age Factorj  Multiplierj  Y ears of Servicei  FASi (6)
The Multiplierj term in Equation 6 is a factor that varies across DB plans (indexed by
j) , but typically has a value between 1.0 and 2.0. Y ears of Servicei is the number of
years served by individual i upon retirement and FASi is her nal average salary, which
is typically an average of the nal three or ve highest salaries (the number of years used
in the calculation varies across DB plans). Of particular interest is the Age Factorj,
which is designed to reduce the stream of annual benets by some specic schedule if the
individual retires before plan j0s NRA to re
ect a longer life expectancy at retirement.
The Age Factor equals one if the employee retires at (or after) the plan's NRA. The
key feature for retirement incentives is that workers are not compensated for shortened
life expectancies at retirement if they postpone retirement beyond the plans NRA. In
some instances, the Age Factor schedule is such that it is optimal to retire before the
plan's NRA. In addition, DB plans often impose a maximum replacement rate for annual
benets, typically around 80 percent of FAS. This could result in additional years of service
from postponing retirement not counting in the computation of annual benets. Hence,
postponing retirement past the plan's NRA leads to a reduction in pension wealth for DB
plan participants. For DC plans, however, an additional year of service results in another
year of employer contributions on a (typically) higher salary base as well as an additional
15year of compounding for assets held in the account. At retirement, the DC participant
could elect to annuitize the assets, which would actuarially adjust for her remaining life
expectancy. Hence, DC plans do not impose incentives for retirement and can be considered
age-neutral with respect to their eect on retirement age.
It is important to note that the dierence in retirement age between DB and DC plans
is related to the NRA of DB plans. For DB participants, their expected pension wealth has
an inverted \U-shape" over retirement age and is typically maximized at the plans NRA:
delaying retirement beyond the NRA leads to a reduction in expected benets. However,
for DC participants, the expected value of pension wealth is increasing in retirement age.
Whether DB plans will induce an earlier retirement age, on average, relative to DC plans
depends on the NRA of the DB plan. If the NRA is 55, then DB participants would likely
retire from their careers before DC participants on average. However, if the NRA is 75,
then the DB plan would have the opposite eect: DB participants would retire after DC
participants on average.
The NRA varies across DB plans. Figure 1 displays the distribution of NRA for the
DB plans oered to state public employees. The two most common ages are 60 and 65,
followed by 62 and 55. The average NRA across the fty U.S. States is 62.1. Figure 2 plots
the distribution of NRA for those faculty members in the sample who are participating in
a DB plan at public institutions. The most common NRA for participants in the sample
is 65, followed by 60 and 62; only a small fraction of the sample are in a DB plan with a
NRA of 55. The average NRA for these participants is 62.7. Given these results, we would
expect the retirement age of faculty in DB plans to be below that of DC plan participants
on average.13 Figures 3 and 4 graph the unconditional distribution of expected retirement
13This is because delaying retirement always increases expected pension wealth for DC participants,
which is not the case of DB participants. However, whether the retirement age of DC participants is above
or below DB participants depends on the distribution of preferences over career length because DC plans
are neutral with respect to retirement age.
16age by plan type. For DC participants, more individuals expect to retire after age 65
relative to DB participants, resulting in a higher average expected retirement age for DC
participants.
4 Retirement Condence Survey Data and
Methodology
The Retirement Condence Survey of College and University Faculty collects information
on retirement expectations and saving behavior of faculty in higher education. It consists
of a representative sample of all college and university faculty and includes 1,307 responses,
surveyed by telephone between March and May of 2005. Some information on institutional
characteristics, as well as demographic information, was also collected. The purpose of this
survey was to better understand retirement expectations and saving behavior of faculty in
higher education as well as to compare the ndings to those collected in the 2005 Retirement
Condence Survey, which polls American workers employed in all sectors and industries.
Preliminary results compiled by the TIAA-CREF Institute found that faculty members
are more likely to have started saving for retirement and more condent that they will
have enough money in retirement relative to the general working population (see Table
2) (Yakoboski, 2005). Faculty are also more likely to be covered by a employer-sponsored
pension plan relative to all working Americans: 59 percent of the working population
report having an employer-sponsored pension plan compared with 85 percent of faculty
respondents. While the ndings in this analysis { the impact of plan type on retirement {
are relevant to academic institutions as well as to non-academic employers, one needs to
keep the dierences between these two groups in mind.
This paper restricts its analysis to faculty participating in an employer-sponsored re-
17tirement plan. Hence, faculty members who were either not oered a plan or were oered a
plan but chose not to participate are not included in this analysis. To analyze the eect of
plan type on expected retirement age as well as the determinants of plan choice, faculty are
categorized by the menu of pension plans oered by the institution: 1) No Choice { faculty
at institutions that only oer a DC, a DB, or a combined plan; and, 2) Choice { faculty at
institutions in which a choice between a DB and a DC plan is oered. The categorization
refers to whether the institution oers one primary plan to faculty, or whether it oers
a choice between a DB and a DC plan for its primary plan. Because these are survey
data, classication of faculty members into plan-oering categories could be problematic if
individuals do not accurately recall the menu of plan options oered at the time they were
hired. For faculty employed at public institutions, this paper uses the Survey of Changes in
Faculty Retirement Policies collected by the AAUP in 2000 as well as correspondence with
human resource managers at the state universities to determine which public universities
oer a choice between plans.14 For those faculty employed at a private university, the plan
menu is constructed based on which plan the faculty member is participating in and their
recollection of plan oerings. However, the problem of recall is less of a concern for faculty
employed at private universities because they are rarely oered a choice between plans (see
Table 1).
Table 3 shows the distribution of faculty by whether a choice between plans was oered:
the majority of faculty members were not oered a choice (577 out of 991). Just under half
of faculty members at public institutions were oered a choice (408 out of 882) and only a
handful of faculty at private institutions report being oered a choice between plans (6 out
of 109). The distribution of pension plans is given by institution type and choice in Table
4. The majority of faculty at public institutions (501 out of 882) participate in a DB plan
14The AAUP data include plan oerings for 607 academic institutions.
18in some capacity { either only a DB plan or both a DB and DC plan { while the majority
of faculty in private universities participate in only a DC plan (85 out of 109).
Faculty members who indicate that they participate in both a DB and DC plan and
who do not have a choice between plans are in one of the following situations: 1) the DB
plan is the primary employer-sponsored plan and they are making additional contributions
to a supplemental TDA plan, such as a 403(b); 2) they participate in a combined DB-DC
plan sponsored by the institution; or, 3) the university had a DB plan as its primary plan
when the faculty member was hired but has since closed the plan and now sponsors a DC
plan. Because part of their retirement wealth is subject to the benet rules of the DB
plan, these individuals are separated from faculty in a DC-only plan. Faculty members
who participate in both plans and who were oered a choice between plans are likely in the
rst scenario: they elected to enroll in the DB plan and also contribute to a supplemental
TDA plan. Hence, these faculty members are classied as having chosen a DB plan as
their primary plan; the determinants of making additional contributions to a TDA is also
examined in this study.
The primary goal of this paper is to examine the eect of pension plan incentives on
expected retirement age. Table 5 shows the unconditional expected retirement age by plan
type and menu of plan oerings. The dierence across plans is evident in the unconditional
mean: faculty members in a DC-only plan expect to retire one and a half years later, on
average, than those participating in a DB plan. The dierence is greater for those faculty
members who were oered a choice between plans (nearly two years), suggesting that
preferences enhance plan incentives. The analysis in Section 5.3 will attempt to estimate
the relative eect of plan incentives and preferences.
Table 6 lists descriptive statistics of faculty member characteristics by whether they
were oered a choice between plans. The two groups are not signicantly dierent in terms
19of individual characteristics.15 Because the two groups are very similar, the assumption
made by this paper that the menu of plan oerings by the institution is not a primary
determinant of a faculty-institution pairing seems reasonable.
The institutional characteristics do dier across the two groups (Table 7). A larger
fraction of individuals who are oered a choice are employed by public institutions, which
is expected given that nearly all institutions oering a choice are public (Ehrenberg, 2001).
Individuals in institutions without a choice are more likely to work at four-year academic
institutions, which is related to the public-private dierence between the groups because
two-year institutions are much less likely to be private (2 out of 238 faculty are employed
at a two-year, private institution). Faculty who are not oered a choice between plans are
also more likely to be covered by Social Security, which is also related to the public-private
dierence because exemptions from Social Security were only possible for public-sector
employees.16
One possible concern for this analysis is that the terms of the two plans (DB versus
DC) oered by institutions with a choice strictly favor one plan over the other, limiting
the role for individual preferences in plan selection. In the Survey of Changes in Faculty
Retirement Policies, those institutions that oer a choice between DB and DC plans report
the percent of faculty enrolled in each plan. To evaluate the possible role for preference in
the choice between plans, the percent of faculty enrolled in the DB plan is computed by
state, with plan enrollment weighted by the number of faculty at each institution. Figure
5 shows the percent of faculty enrolled in the DB plan for those twenty states whose public
universities oer a choice between pension plans.17 Sixteen of the twenty states have DB
15The one exception is that there is a greater fraction of individual with household income category of
$75K to $150K among faculty who have a choice between plans.
16States whose employees do not participate in Social Security and who oer faculty a choice between
pension plans include Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas.
17These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mary-
land Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
20enrollment between 20 and 80 percent, which suggests that the terms of one pension plan
do not strictly dominate the other for most of these university systems. The most one-sided
states are Arkansas (3.1 percent in DB), Iowa (8.8 percent in DB), Tennessee (13.4 percent
in DB) and Texas (19.5 percent in DB). Because of the relative balance in enrollment
percentages for most states, it is likely that career length preferences aect an individual's
choice between plans. In addition, the ndings of this study are robust to excluding the
35 faculty members from Iowa and Arkansas from the analysis.
5 Results
This section rst examines determinants of plan selection for faculty members with a choice
between pension plans. Similar to Clark and Pitts (1999), faculty members are assumed to
choose the plan { DB or DC plan { that will give them the highest expected value. Second,
this study attempts to quantify the eect of plan incentives on expected retirement age of
faculty without a choice. Third, by comparing the expected retirement age of those faculty
with a choice between plans to those without a choice, this analysis attempts to determine
the relative role of career length preferences and plan incentives on expected retirement
age.
For faculty without a choice, the eect of plan type on expected retirement behavior
operates through dierences in retirement incentives between the two plans. This assumes
that faculty choose an employer based on total compensation, research support, and teach-
ing load, and not on the type of retirement plan oered.18 Hence, the distribution of
Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. Public universities in Alaska also oered a choice until 2006, but there are
no individuals in the sample from Alaska.
18Pension plan type is treated as exogenous for these workers, which is plausible because of the thin labor
market for faculty and the high weight placed on non-monetary aspects of the job. However, this assumption
is tenuous for workers outside of academia. Because pension plan type can be considered exogenous for
faculty, it is possible to isolate the eect of plan incentives.
21faculty preferences regarding career length is assumed to be the same across plan types
for this group, and thus any dierences in expected retirement age uncovered between the
plan types is attributed to plan incentives. However, the impact of plan type on expected
retirement age for those with a choice is due to a combination of incentives and preferences
because participants choose the pension plan that gives them the highest expected value,
which takes into account their preferences regarding career length.
5.1 Determinants of Plan Choice
Examining the choice of plans by faculty could provide insight as to how workers outside of
academia value DB plans relative to DB plans, which could serve to inform policymakers
on how the transition from DB to DC plans has aected worker welfare and help guide
policy debates on proposed reforms to Social Security. Of the 414 faculty members in
this group, a total of 373 were used in this analysis due to missing values for one or more
covariates. Table 8 lists the individual characteristics for individuals with a choice between
plans by which plan they elected. The two groups are statistically dierent in terms of
educational attainment and Social Security coverage. The probability of choosing a plan
is analyzed as a function of gender, nancial literacy and scal health, household income,
Social Security coverage, educational attainment, and the decade and age of hire using the
latent index model described in Section 3. Table 9 shows the marginal eects from three
dierent probit models.
As previously mentioned, there are three groups of plan participants among workers
who are oered a choice between plans: 1) those only in a DC plan; 2) those only in a DB
plan; and 3) those in a DB plan who are also contributing to a TDA. Column 1 of Table 9
analyzes the probability of enrolling in a DC-only plan. Faculty members without a Ph.D.
are less likely to enroll in a DC plan { those with a Master's or Bachelor's Degree are over
2217 percentage points less likely to enroll in a DC plan and those with a professional degree
are 16 percentage points less likely.19 Current household income as well as measures of
nancial literacy and scal health do not signicantly aect the probability of choosing
to enroll in a DC plan.20 Faculty hired at younger ages are less likely to enroll in a DC
plan relative to those hired at age 40 or over, which could re
ect dierent expectations
about obtaining tenure, although the dierence is not statistically signicant. Faculty hired
in the 1980s are most likely to enroll in a DC plan than faculty hired in other decades,
which could be due to the expansion of tax-advantage saving vehicles during this time that
increased worker exposure to DC plans.
The strongest determinant of choosing not to enroll in a DC plan is a lack of Social
Security coverage: faculty without coverage are nearly 35 percentage points less likely to
enroll in a DC plan than those with coverage. This suggests that these workers value
having a life annuity as a part of their portfolio of retirement wealth and they seem to be
diversifying the source of their retirement income.
Column 2 of Table 9 analyzes the determinants of choosing to enroll in only the DB
plan relative to a DC-only or DB plus TDA plan to better understand the determinants
of plan choice. Faculty who choose to enroll only in a DB plan seem to be less nancially
savvy and of lower income: those who have calculated the amount of savings they will need
for retirement are 10 percentage points less likely to enroll only in a DB plan and those in
the medium and highest household income bracket are nearly 13 and 19 percentage points
less likely to participate in only a DB plan. Faculty with a professional degree are nearly 15
percentage points more likely to choose to only participate in a DB plan (relative to those
with a Ph.D.) and those with a Master's degree are 8 percentage points more likely, but
19Faculty with a professional degree consists of those with a J.D. or M.D.
20Calculated Retirement Savings is a binary variable for whether they have tried to calculate how much
savings they will need for retirement and No Debt Problems is a binary variable for whether their level of
debt is currently a minor or major problem.
23this dierence is not statistically signicant. Social Security coverage is not a statistically
signicant factor that aects the decision to enroll only in a DB plan relative to those in
a DC-only plan or those in a DB plus TDA plan.
Column 3 limits the sample to those faculty members who elected to enroll in a DB
plan as their primary plan and analyzes determinants of contributing to a supplementary
TDA plan, such as a 403(b). Individuals who are more nancially savvy are more likely to
contribute to a TDA plan: those who have attempted to calculate the amount of savings
they will need for retirement are nearly 16 percentage points more likely to contribute to a
TDA. Those individuals with higher household income are also more likely to contribute:
relative to those with annual household earnings of less than $75K in 2005, those earning
between $75K and $150K are 19 percentage points more likely to contribute and those
earning over $150K are 30 percentage points more likely. Faculty members not covered by
Social Security are 14 percentage points more likely to contribute to a supplemental TDA,
which could be due to higher take-home pay. Individuals who are part of a married couple
or partnership are less likely to make additional contributions, although the dierence is
not signicant at conventional levels.
Overall, there appears to be a signicant amount of unexplained heterogeneity in the
decision of which pension plan to select. Gender, age when hired, and marital status
are not signicant determinants of plan choice in any of the specications. The nding
that those with a Ph.D. are most likely to enroll in a DC plan could re
ect dierences in
mobility expectations or a higher preference for a long career. Individuals with the highest
household income are most likely to participate in a DC plan, either through their primary
employer-sponsored plan or through a supplemental TDA. Individuals who participate in
only a DB plan appear to be the least nancially savvy and are of the lowest household
income.
24The most interesting nding is that Social Security coverage is the primary determinant
of plan choice: individuals without coverage are substantially more likely to enroll in a DB
plan, which provides a similar stream of income in retirement as Social Security. This
suggests that the transition from employer-sponsored DB plans to DC plans in the private
sector has not imposed a signicant utility cost on workers due to the widespread coverage
of these workers by Social Security. However, reforms that remove or reduce the dened
benet aspect of Social Security could induce welfare loss as workers will have increased
exposure to longevity risk and nancial market risk and may be unable to diversify their
portfolio of retirement wealth.
5.2 The Impact of Plan Type on Expected Retirement Age
For those faculty members not given a choice between plans, the type of plan the individual
participates in is assumed to be exogenous. The section estimates the eect of individ-
ual and institutional characteristics { including plan type { on expected retirement age.
The rst column of Table 10 displays the estimates from an OLS regression of expected
retirement age on plan type for faculty at institutions without a choice between plans.21
Unconditionally, those in a DC plan expect to retire a year and a quarter later than those
in a DB plan and the dierence is signicant at the one-percent level for the regression
sample. After controlling for individual and employer-provided retiree health insurance,
the dierence drops to eight months and is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level.
Financial literacy or savviness are signicant determinants of retirement: individuals
who have attempted to calculate the amount of savings they need for retirement expect
to retire 10 months earlier and those who are in a good nancial position, as measured
by incidence of debt problems, expect to retire a year earlier. Educational attainment is
21Of the 577 faculty participating in a pension plan who were not oering a choice, 160 were dropped for
missing values for covariates
25a signicant determinant of expected retirement age: those with a Master's or Bachelor's
degree expect to retire a year and four months earlier than those with a Ph.D., which
could re
ect a lower preference for a long career. Gender and martial status are also
signicant determinants of expected retirement age: women expect to retire nearly two
years younger than men and members of a married couple or partnership expect to retire
nearly a year and four months earlier than singles. The availability of health insurance
for retirees lowers the expected retirement age by nearly ve months, but the dierence is
not statistically signicant. Current household income is not a signicant determinant of
expected retirement age. Tenured professors have the highest expected retirement age, but
the dierence relative to a Lecturer/Instructor or an Assistant Professor is not statistically
signicant.
These results indicate that the lack of retirement incentives inherent in DC plans pro-
long careers of faculty: faculty at institutions that only sponsor a DC plan expect to retire
nearly 8 month later than those who at institutions with a DB plan. These results suggest
another channel that human resource departments could use to induce earlier retirements:
provide nancial education to faculty members. Individuals who are more prepared for
retirement have lower expected retirement ages on average.
The last column of Table 10 reports estimates from the OLS regression of expected
retirement on individual characteristics and plan type for faculty members with a choice
between plans. The unconditional dierence in expected retirement age for the regression
sample is one year and eight months and signicant at the one-percent level. This large
dierence persists even after controlling for individual characteristics and provision of re-
tiree health insurance by the employer: individuals who elect to enroll in a DC plan expect
to retire fteen months earlier than those who elect a DB plan. The dierence remains sig-
nicant at the one-percent level. Hence, individual preferences over career length enhance
26the dierence in retirement incentives inherent in the two plans.
Similar to faculty without a choice, nancial literacy and scal health are primary
determinants of expected retirement age: both are associated with a expected retirement
age of over one year younger than those lacking nancial sophistication or who burdened
by debt. Individuals with a Master's or Bachelor's degree expect to retire nearly two
years earlier than those with a Ph.D., a more sizable dierence than that found among
faculty without a choice. This nding is consistent with preferences enhancing dierences
in retirement incentives across plans because the results from Section 5.1 show that these
individuals are more likely to enroll in DB plans relative to DC plans. Similar to the group
without a choice, women expect to retire about a year earlier than men; couples expect
to retire later than singles, but this dierence is not signicantly dierent. Interestingly,
years of service has a sizable eect on expected retirement age for these individuals: those
with less than ten years of service expect to retire over two and a half years later than
those with 30 or more years of service. The eect is driven by those who chose to enroll
in a DB plan and is likely due to the vesting requirements of these plans. However, it is
unclear why the eect is only present among faculty who have a choice.
Overall, nancial literacy and pension plan incentives are signicantly related to ex-
pected retirement age. For those institutions with only a DC plan, nancial education
is a mechanism by which institutions could indirectly in
uence the retirement age of fac-
ulty: nancial preparedness appears to lower expected retirement age. Employers could
then target wage increases to retain those faculty with the highest productivity. Oering
faculty a choice between plans appears to enhance the dierence in retirement incentives
across the two plans, which shows that faculty are taking into account these plan incentives
when making their choice. The next section pools the two groups together to more clearly
dierentiate the role of incentives versus preferences over career length.
275.3 Directly Comparing Incentives to Preferences
By pooling the two groups, we can analyze the impact of plan type while controlling for
whether the faculty member chose the plan in which they participate. In their analysis
of the take-up of phased retirement at UNC, Allen, Clark, and McDermed (2004) nd
that faculty members who chose a DB pension plan were more likely to choose phased
retirement, which could re
ect the incentives inherent in the DB plan or re
ect a greater
preference for leisure. This paper attempts to dierentiate the two eects.
Table 11 shows the OLS estimates of the eect of plan type, choice of plan, and in-
dividual characteristics on expected retirement age. In terms of plan type and choice,
individuals are classied into four groups: 1) those in a DC plan without a choice; 2)
those in a DB plan without a choice, 3) those who chose a DC plan; and, 4) those who
chose a DB plan (excluded group). Faculty who participate in a DC plan have the highest
expected retirement age { those who chose to enroll in a DC plan expect to retire over
sixteen months after those who chose a DB plan. Faculty in a DC plan without a choice
expect to retire fteen months after those who chose to enroll in a DB plan. There is not
signicant dierence between the expected retirement age of those in a DC by choice and
those in a DC plan without choice. Comparing those faculty members without a choice,
those in a DC plan expect to retire over eight months later than those in a DB plan and
the dierence is signicant at the ten-percent level. Faculty who choose to enroll in a DB
plan expect to retire nearly 7 months earlier than those in a DB plan without choice, but
the dierence is only marginally signicant (p-value = .141). The remaining results are
similar to those presented in Section 5.2. Indicators of nancial literacy and scal health
continue to be associated with earlier expected retirement ages. Women expect to retire
nearly a year and a half before men and individuals with a Master's or Bachelor's degree
expect to retire over a year and a half earlier than those with a Ph.D.
28Hence, plan incentives aect expected retirement age, generating an eight-month wedge
between plans; preferences of individuals over career length double the eect. The role of
preferences appears a bit asymmetric: the eect of plan choice is slightly stronger for
those who choose to enroll in a DB plan. This means that participants who choose a DB
plan have a stronger preference for a shortened career than those who choose a DC plan
have for a longer career. This nding is consistent with the DB benet formulas actuarial
adjustment for early retirement.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that the age-neutrality feature of DC plans with respect to pension ac-
crual results in longer expected employment of DC participants relative to DB participants.
Additionally, preferences over career length enhance the dierences in retirement incentives
between DB and DC plans: the greatest dierence in expected retirement age is between
faculty who chooe to enroll in a DB plan and those who chose to enroll in a DC plan. These
results were obtained by assuming that plan oerings are exogenous to employer-employee
matches, which is sensible in academia due to the thin market and large weight placed on
other non-monetary aspects of the job. This allows for a relatively clean separation of plan
incentives from career-length preferences, which is not typically attainable using data from
other labor markets. Hence, this analysis shows that preferences over career length play
as large of a role as incentives when comparing retirement behaviors across the two plans.
When crafting human resource policies, employers need to be aware of the retirement
incentives inherent in the pension plans they oer as well as the ability of preferences to
amplify these dierences. In addition, nancial literacy appears to play an important role
by both lowering expected retirement age and increasing the probability of contributing to
supplemental DC plans. This suggests that helping faculty members use a DC plan could
29oset the postponement of retirement due to the age-neutrality of DC plans.
As for policymakers, nancial education will play a crucial role in preparing individuals
for the investment responsibility inherent in the increasingly popular DC plan and the
subsequent exposure to longevity risk. In addition, the plan choice of faculty members
reveals a desire to diversify their sources of retirement income by including both DC and
DB plans in their portfolio of retirement wealth. If we can generalize this result outside of
academia, this impliels that the widespread transition from DB to DC plans in the private
sector likely caused little welfare loss because of the widespread coverage of these workers
by Social Security, which provides an income strea similar to DB plans. However, reducing
or eliminating the dened benet aspect of Social Security could negatively aect worker
welfare and needs to be taken into account when evaluating potential reforms.
It is important to keep in the mind the limitations of this analysis. In particular,
this paper examines the pension plan choice and retirement expectations of college and
university faculty, who are more educated and more nancially literate than most U.S.
workers (Yakoboski, 2005). The study also uses expected retirement age as the outcome of
analysis, which could dier from actual retirement ages. Unlike the case study approach of
Brown and Weisbenner (2007), the data used in this analysis do not contain specic features
of each pension plan oered by universities and, therefore, this study cannot compare the
relative merits of the plans or adequately address the role of default options in plan choice.
30Table 1: Pension Plan Oerings by Institution Type
Institution Type Count DB Only DC Only Combination
Choice of DB
or DC plan
All 607 15.3% 41.1% 7.6% 35.9%
Public 392 20.9% 12.7% 10.9% 55.2%
Private 215 5.1% 93.0% 1.4% 0.05%
Source: Pencavel (2005) and Ehrenberg (2003) using data collected by AAUP in 2000.
Table 2: Pension Plan Oerings by Institution Type
Condence About Retirement Income Propects
Faculty All Workers
Very Condent 35% 25%
Somewhat Condent 51% 40%
Not too Condent 11% 17%
Not at all Condent 3% 17%
Don't Know/Refused .5% 1%
Retirement Savings
Faculty All Workers
Have Started Saving for Retirement 95% 69%
Currently Saving for Retirement
91% 91%
(Among those who have saved)




31Table 3: Classication of Faculty by Institution Type and Plan Choice
Plan Oerings
Institution Type No Choice Choice Total
Public 474 408 882
Private 103 6 109
Total 577 414 991
Table 4: Classication of Faculty by Institution Type, Plan Choice, and Plan Enrollment
Public Plan Participation No Choice Choice Total
DC Only 205 176 381
DB Only 114 106 220
DB and DC 155* 126** 281
Total 474 408 882
Private Plan Participation No Choice Choice Total
DC Only 80 5 85
DB Only 1 1 2
DB and DC 22* 0 22
Total 103 6 109
* Participation in both DB and TDA, a combined plan, or DB plan closure
** Participation in both DB and TDA
Table 5: Expected Retirement Age by Plan Type and Choice
Plan Type No Choice Choice All Observations
DC-Only Plan 66.24 66.19 66.22 434
DB Plan 64.92 64.30 64.65 482
All Plans 65.57 65.15 65.39 916
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Faculty by Plan Selection
Chose DB Plan Chose DC Plan
Characteristics Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Financial Position
Calculated Retirement Income 69.0% 0.464 74.8% 0.435
No Debt Problems 78.3% 0.407 79.3% 0.407
HH Income < $75k 26.9% 0.444 20.1% 0.402
$75K < HH Income < $150k 63.0% 0.484 65.4% 0.477
HH Income over $150k 10.2% 0.303 14.5% 0.353
Education
Masters Degree or Less 35.2%* 0.351 22.0%* 0.416
Professional Degree 15.3% 0.491 10.1% 0.302
Ph.D. 49.5%* 10.44 67.9%* 0.468
Employment
Hired before 1980 30.1% 0.460 27.0% 0.446
Hired 1980 to 1989 32.9% 0.471 38.3% 0.488
Hired 1990 or after 29.2% 0.456 23.9% 0.428
Instructor or Lecturer 14.4% 0.351 12.6% 0.333
Assistant Professor 12.0% 0.322 10.1% 0.302
Tenured Professor 73.6% 0.442 77.4% 0.420
Not Covered by Soc. Sec 33.6%* 0.474 10.1%* 0.302
Demographics
Female 36.1% .481 28.3% 0.452
Married or Living with Partner 81.5% .389 86.2% 0.343
Hire Age 34.1 7.4 35.0 7.5
Hire Age: less than 28 19.9% 40.0% 14.5% 0.353
Hire Age: 28 to 34 36.6% 48.3% 37.7% 0.486
Hire Age: 35 to 39 25.9% 43.9% 25.2% 0.435
Hire Age: 40 or over 17.6% 43.9% 22.6% 0.420
Observations 216 159
* Statistically Dierent at 5% Level
35Table 9: Determinants of Plan Selection
Chose DC Chose DB Added TDA
(only) (only) (of those who chose DB)
1 2 3
Calcuated Retirement Income 0.038 -0.101 0.158
0.062 0.056+ 0.081*
No Debt Problems 0.100 -0.020 -0.071
0.063 0.057 0.087
Income $75K  Income  $150K 0.050 -0.126 0.191
0.071 0.063* 0.092*
Income over $150K 0.101 -0.187 0.300
0.108 0.057** 0.108**
Excluded: Income less than $75K
Masters Degree or less -0.172 0.082 -0.020
0.066** 0.063 0.092
Professional Degree -0.163 0.145 -0.106
0.074* 0.080+ 0.107
Excluded: PHD
Hired in 1960s or 1970s 0.000 0.026 -0.044
0.092 0.079 0.120
Hired in 1980 0.121 -0.073 0.066
0.073+ 0.059 0.098
Excluded: Hired in 1990s or 2000s
Instructor or Lecturer 0.150 -0.073 0.045
0.098 0.071 0.129
Assistant Professor 0.065 -0.071 0.093
0.101 0.073 0.126
Excluded Tenured Professor
Not Covered by Soc. Security -0.344 0.053 0.142
0.052** 0.058 0.076+
Female -0.034 0.036 -0.048
0.062 0.054 0.081
Couple 0.102 0.031 -0.154
0.074 0.064 0.098
Hire Age: Under 28 -0.155 0.039 0.069
0.095 0.095 0.140
Hire Age: 28 to 34 -0.063 0.003 0.031
0.082 0.072 0.117
Hire Age: 35 to 39 -0.076 -0.020 0.101
0.079 0.069 0.110
Excluded: Age 40 or older
Log-Likelihood -226.5 -204.7 -139.4
Observations 373 373 214
dF/dX Listed Above; St. Errors listed Below
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
36Table 10: Determinants of Expected Retirement Age { By Choice
No Choice Choice
DC Plan (only) 0.670 1.283
.391+ 0.414**
Calcuated Retirement Income -0.788 -1.190
.447+ 0.477*
No Debt Problems -0.986 -1.187
.430* 0.490*
Income $75K  Income  $150K -0.526 -0.322
0.487 0.551
Income over $150K 0.071 -0.202
0.702 0.789
Excluded: Income less than $75K
Masters Degree or less -0.136 -1.939
.565* 0.532**
Professional Degree 0.020 -0.147
0.570 0.618
Excluded: PHD
Years of Service: Less than 10 years -0.052 2.556
0.832 0.932**
Years of Service: 10 to 19 years -0.011 0.520
0.637 0.713
Years of Service: 20 to 29 years -0.930 -0.124
0.613 0.688
Excluded: 30 or more years
Instructor or Lecturer -0.444 -0.081
0.681 0.680
Assistant Professor -0.779 -0.046
0.738 0.795
Excluded: Tenured Professor











dF/dX Listed Above; St. Errors listed Below
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
37Table 11: Determinants of Expected Retirement Age { Pooled Sample
Chose DC Plan 1.388
0.428**
DC Plan - No Choice 1.254
0.391**
DB Plan - No Choice 0.555
0.376
Excluded: Chose DB Plan
Calcuated Retirement Income -0.987
0.321**
No Debt Problems -1.147
0.319**
Income $75K  Income  $150K -0.618
0.361+
Income over $150K -0.235
0.519
Excluded: Income less than $75K





Years of Service: Less than 10 years 1.161
0.613+
Years of Service: 10 to 19 years 0.189
0.473
Years of Service: 20 to 29 years -0.672
0.456
Excluded: 30 or more years
















dF/dX Listed Above; St. Errors listed Below
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
38Figure 1: Distribution of NRA for State-Sponsored DB Plans { Dashed line denotes the
mean NRA
39Figure 2: Distribution of NRA for Faculty Enrolled in a DB Plan at Public Universities {
Dashed line denotes the mean NRA
40Figure 3: Distribution of Expected Retirement Age for DB Participants { Dashed line
denotes the mean value
41Figure 4: Distribution of Expected Retirement Age for DC Participants { Dashed line
denotes the mean value
42Figure 5: DB Plan Enrollment Percentages at Public University Systems with a Choice
between Plans
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